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I. INTRODUCTION
Few concepts are more fundamental to American democracy
than the impartiality of the judicial branch of the government. One
of the "injuries and usurpations" tending to "absolute Tyranny''
recited in the Declaration of Independence was that King George III
had "made Judges dependent on his will alone." 1 The means of this
dependency -the King's control over the "tenure of their offices" and
"the amount and payment of their salaries" 2 - were explicitly
addressed in Article III of the Constitution.3 But, life tenure and a
guaranteed salary, while reasonable and perhaps necessary, are
insufficient to protect against judicial bias.
Among the most important judge-made rules to increase the
odds of impartiality in decision making is the doctrine of stare decisis.
The tendency to make arbitrary decisions is reduced when a court is
required to honor established judicial decisions. Of course, the
doctrine requires that, before a decision is made, existing precedent
is identified, addressed and, unless overturned for well-documented
reasons, followed.
This article explores two related decisions, M&G Polymers USA,
LLC v. Tackett4 and CNH Industrial, LLC v. Reese,5 where the Supreme
Court ignored long-standing precedent and adopted and applied
contrary legal standards. The specific issue was the legal standard
for determining the contractual rights of retirees with collectively
bargained healthcare benefits.6 While the context was not one with
Constitutional implications, at least on its face, the overriding issue
of maintenance of judicial impartiality was implicated. The fact that,
as a result of the decisions, tens of thousands of retirees lost or will
lose their healthcare benefits,7 is a minor loss compared to the
damage done if the Supreme Court can bypass the requirements of
stare decisis by simply refusing to acknowledge and in the process
disregarding the holdings of, and the policies underlying, its earlier
decisions.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2, 11 (U.S. 1776).
Id. at para. 11.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015).
CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).
Id. at 762-63.
Id. at 764.
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING IMPARTIAL
A. Constitutional Implications
The possibility that justice would be perverted by the rich and
powerful was a fundamental concern of the Founding Fathers.
According to John Locke, a major source for their political
philosophy, a person who abandons the law of nature for the benefits
of political society, also abandons the law of personal justice. 8 The
primary function of political society is to serve as the arbiter of
disputes that arise among society 's members over competing
personal rights. In this context, justice must be administered so that
society understands that the government treats all citizens equally
under the law. Or, as Locke stated: there must be "one rule for rich
and poor, for the favorite at court, and for the country man at
plough." 9
The "thirteen united States of America" in declaring their
independence from Great Britain, accused King George III of a
"history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct
object the est ablishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States." 10
Among these usurpations was that King George "has obstructed the
Administration of Justice by refusing his Assent to Laws for the
establishing Judiciary powers. He has made Judges dependent on his
Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries." 11
These concerns that the new federal government would make
judges dependent on its will alone, thus supplanting the British
sovereign so recently deposed were directly addressed in Article
III of the United States Constitution. Section I of Article III provides,
in its entirety:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in

8. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 342-44 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.).
9. Id. at 381.
10. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
11. Id. at para. 10, 11.
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Office.12
Article III does not require that federal judges be impartial.
Instead, the two expressed requirements, lifetime tenure and
undiminished compensation, were intended to make the judiciary
independent of both the President and the Congress, ensuring that
judges would be, if they so choose, free from the pressures of
temporal political forces and thereby more likely to be impartial.
In The Federalist Papers No. 78, Alexander Hamilton wrote that
courts possess "neither force nor will, but merely judgment . . II 13
Judicial authority can come only from public perception of the
"integrity and moderation" 14 of the courts. Without that perception,
Hamilton wrote, the rule of law is undermined, "sap[ping] the
foundations of public and private confidence, and . . . introduc[ing]
in its stead universal distrust and distress." 15
In Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania. v. Casey,16 the
Court said that, because a court cannot generally "coerce obedience
to its decrees," its "power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance
of the Judiciary as fit to determine wh at the Nation's law means and
to declare what it demands." 17
Former Justice Kennedy reiterated that fundamental theme in
New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres:18 "The rule of law, which
is a foundation of freedom, presupposes a functioning judiciary
respected for its independence, its professional attainments, and the
absolute probity of its judges."19 According to the Seventh Circuit in
Bauer v. Shepard20 : "The judicial system depends on its reputation for
impartiality; it is public acceptance, rather than the sword or the
purse, that leads decisions to be obeyed and averts vigilantism and
civil strife." 21
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Id. at 470.
Id.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See also Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ( The power and
the prerogative of a court . . . rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments. ).
17. Id. at 865. See also Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ( The power and the prerogative of a court . . . rest, in the end,
upon the respect accorded to its judgments. ).
18. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
19. Id. at 212 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
20. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010).
21. Id. at 712.
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These lofty statements declare an aspiration rather than a
reality. Judicial independence and impartiality are ideals, not
foregone conclusions. Given the multiple factors involved in most
decisions, and the fact that all appellate decisions require the
concurrence of more than one judge, judicial impartiality is an
abstraction which cannot easily be objectively measured. And,
because the judicial system seldom directly affects ordinary citizens,
whether and when the ideal approaches the reality is something that
most citizens rarely consider, or if they consider it, often cannot
possibly fathom. It is thus important that any departures from the
ideal be brought to light and carefully examined.
While litigants have a Constitutional right to an impartial court,
that right comes, not from Section III, but from the Due Process
Clause.22 The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall. . .
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." 23 In In re Murchison,24 the Supreme Court held that "[a] fair trial
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." 25
The standard for judicial impartiality under the Due Process
Clause is an objective one that does not require a showing of actual
bias. Instead, "[i]n defining these standards the Court has asked
whether, 'under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness,' the interest 'poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of
due process is to be adequately implemented. 26 In Coley v. Bagley,27
the Sixth Circuit stated "[s]ince judicial bias is a structural defect both
when actual and when merely unconstitutionally probable, if either
type of judicial bias is proven, Strickland prejudice need not be
proven." 28
In practice, judges decide claims of bias and judges have proven
reluctant guardians of the people's right to an independent,
impartial judiciary. The presumption is, and probably must be, that
judges will act impartially regardless of their personal ideology.
111

22. U.S. CONST. amend V. Nothing in Article III requires judicial impartiality. In fact, the
right to lifetime tenure makes it much more difficult to remove a judge who proves, after
appointment, to be biased in decision making.
23. Id.
24. In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
25. Id. at 136.
26. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883-84 (2009) (quoting Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
27. Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741 (6th Cir. 2013).
28. Id. at 750 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984) (internal citations
omitted)).

146

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:2

Challenges based on perceived bias implicate a judge's personal
integrity. Judges judging themselves undoubtedly most often believe
they are unbiased or that they can decide cases fairly despite
personal beliefs. Judges judging other judges bend over backward
not to do so, based on concerns of collegiality or that they too will
appear biased in their assessment.
The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause
requires recusal of judges only in extraordinary circumstances, a
point well illustrated by the facts of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.29
There, Massey Coal had appealed a $50 million adverse jury verdict
to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.30 While the appeal
was pending, the CEO of Massey Coal contributed $3 million to
replace an incumbent on the Supreme Court with an attorney more
sympathetic to its position.31 After Massey's candidate was elected,
he refused to recuse himself and, in fact, became the deciding vote in
reversing the judgment against his benefactor.32 A bare majority of
the United States Supreme Court concluded that, under these
circumstances, the Due Process Clause required the judge's recusal .33
B. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Litigants are not solely dependent on the Due Process clause to
protect them from arbitrary judicial decision-making. Courts,
through rules and common law decisions, have established certain
prudential standards intended to reduce judicial bias. Perhaps the
best known of these is the doctrine of stare decisis . The words " stare
decisis" is a shortened form of the Latin maxim " stare decisis et non
quieta movere" which means "to stand by decisions and not disturb
the undisturbed." 34 Stare decisis is the age old common law policy that
courts should adhere to principles of law developed and decided in
their earlier decisions.
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,35 the Court described stare
decisis as "of fundamental importance to the rule of law" 36 and as a
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Caperton, 556 U.S. 868.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 871.
GABRIEL ADELEYE & KOFI ACQUAH-DADZIE, WORLD DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN
EXPRESSIONS: A RESOURCE FOR READERS AND WRITERS 371 (Thomas J. Sienkewicz & James
T. McDonough, Jr. eds., 1999).
35. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
36. Id. at 172 (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep t of Highways & Pub. Tr., 483 U.S. 468, 494
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''basic, self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is
entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and
preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based on 'an arbitrary
discretion. 37 Justice Benjamin Cardozo referred to stare decisis as the
"every day working rule of our law." 38 Concurring in Hubbard v.
United States,39 Justice Scalia stated:
The doctrine of stare decisis protects the legitimate
expectations of those who live under the law, and, as
Alexander Hamilton observed, is one of the means by
which exercise of "an arbitrary discretion in the courts" is
restrained, The Federalist No. 78, p. 471 (C. Rossiter ed.
1961). Who ignores it must give reasons, and reasons that
go beyond mere demonstration that the overruled opinion
was wrong (otherwise the doctrine would be no doctrine at
all).40
In his concurrence in County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union,41 Justice Kennedy stated: "As a general rule, the
principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings
of our prior cases, but also to their explications of the governing rules
of law." 42
Stare decisis is a principle of policy, not an inexorable
command.43 "Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme
in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance
interests are involved." 44 The policy also has special force with
regard to questions of statutory interpretation.45 It has least force in
cases involving procedural rules implicating fundamental
Constitutional protections.46 Relevant factors as to whether to follow
or change existing precedent include the "antiquity of the precedent,
the reliance interests at stake," and whether the precedent was well
111

(1987)).
37. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton),
superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, see CBOCS
West, Inc. v. Humphrey, 553 U.S. 442, 450 (2008).
38. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1921).
39. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995).
40. Id. at 716 (Scalia, J., concurring).
41. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
42. Id. at 664 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
43. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991), reh g denied, 501 U.S. 1277 (1991).
44. Id.
45. Kurns v. R.R. Friction Products Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 641 (2012).
46. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 119 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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reasoned.47
Of course, for stare decisis to be an effective safeguard against an
arbitrary judiciary, existing precedent must first be identified. But, in
both Tackett48 and Reese,49 the Supreme Court simply ignored its longstanding precedent on precisely what constitutes a collective
bargaining agreement. Absent consideration and understanding of
this critical issue, and the underlying federal labor policy on which
it is based, it was impossible for the Court to determine the
appropriate interpretive standards to be applied to the CBAs at issue
in those cases. The result is that there are now two diametrically
opposed lines of Supreme Court precedent on the issues of collective
bargaining agreements and the interpretative rules that apply to
them one from before Tackett and one after Tackett.
III. AFTER TACKETT CBAS "MUST BE INTERPRETED 'ACCORDING
TO ORDINARY PRINCIPALS OF CONTRACT LAWI l l
A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is an agreement
between an employer and a labor organization selected by the
employees to represent them in (collective) bargaining. As noted in
more detail below, CBAs are governed by federal law. Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, provides federal jurisdiction
for their enforcement.50
Beginning in the mid-1960s, industrial unions and private sector
employers negotiated employer-paid healthcare benefits for retired
employees and their spouses.51 Thereafter, beginning in the 1980's,
the issue of whether these benefits "vest," that is, were intended by
the parties to the CBA to last for the retiree's "lifetime" or were
instead limited to the duration of the CBA, was the subject of
increasing litigation.52 In 2015, the Supreme Court decided M&G
47. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm n, 558 U.S. 310, 362-3 (2010) (quoting Montejo

v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-793 (2009)).
48. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015).
49. CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2018).
50. 29 U.S.C. §185 (2012).
51. See, e.g., Cole v Meritor, Inc., 855 F.3d 695, 697 (6th Cir. 2017); Yolton v. El Paso Tenn.
Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2006); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 954 F. Supp.
1173, 1178 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Fox v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 653, 678 (E.D. Mich.
1995).
52. See, e.g., Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1989); United Steelworkers
v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1988); Century Brass Prods., Inc. v.
UAW (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1986); Local Union No.
150-A, UFCW v. Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66, 69-70 (8th Cir. 1985); Bower v. Bunker
Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1984); UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479
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Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett53 to resolve a perceived conflict in the
Circuits that had developed over the preceding thirty years.
A. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett
In Tackett,54 the particular question was the soundness of the
long-maligned inference of vesting adopted in 1983 by the Sixth
Circuit in UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc.55
In Yard-Man,56 the Sixth Circuit initially stated that ordinary
principles of contract interpretation apply to CBAs, to the extent
consistent with federal labor policies.57 The court then identified
common law contract principles it considered relevant.58 Applying
those principles to the terms of the CBA, the court concluded that
retiree healthcare benefits vested.59 The court then addressed
additional "contextual" factors connected to collective bargaining, in
particular the legal fact that retiree healthcare is a permissive, not
mandatory, subject of bargaining.60 In this context, the court
concluded that "it is unlikely that such benefits, which are typically
understood as a form of delayed compensation or reward for past
service, would be left to the contingencies of future negotiations." 61
Yard-Man then stated: "Further, retiree benefits are in a sense
'status' benefits which, as such, carry with them an inference that
they continue so long as the prerequisite status is maintained." 62 The
court cautioned that no federal labor policy presumptively favors the
vesting of retiree healthcare benefits and that the "nature of such
benefits simply provides another inference of intent," which
"[s]tanding alone . . . would be insufficient to find an intent to create
interminable benefits." 63
Over the years, the Sixth Circuit repeatedly addressed, defined
and narrowed the application of the " Yard-Man inference." The Sixth
Circuit did so in conflicting terms, as indicated by the fact that one
(6th Cir. 1983).
53. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 430.
56. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476.
57. Id. at 1479.
58. Id. at 1479-81.
59. Id. at 1482.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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judge characterized the inference as being either a disguised
"presumption"64 or, in a subsequent case, as "nothing more than this:
a nudge in favor of vesting in close cases." 65
In Tackett, the Court rejected not only the Yard-Man "status"
inference but the entire body of Sixth Circuit law assessing
collectively-bargained healthcare benefits as being contrary to
"ordinary principles of contract law." 66 After a discussion of ERISA,67
the Court stated that: "We interpret collective-bargaining
agreements, including those establishing ERISA plans, according to
ordinary principles of contract law, at least when those principles are
not inconsistent with federal labor policy." 68
While Tackett held that the Yard-Man inference was (wrongly)
gleaned from the "' context' of labor negotiations" and from the
"status" of retirement benefits, rather than from the CBA itself, it did
not stop there.69 Tackett criticized Yard-Man's "purported"
application of the illusory promises rule.70 It held that, post-YardMan, the Sixth Circuit had refused to give any weight to provisions
that supported a contrary conclusion, such as a general termination
clause.71 Tackett criticized the Sixth Circuit's post-Yard-Man decisions
holding that "the tying of eligibility for health care benefits to receipt
of pension benefits suggested an intent to vest healthcare benefits." 72
In particular, Tackett criticized Noe v. PolyOne Corp.,73 where the Sixth
Circuit held that a provision that ties eligibility for retiree healthcare
benefits to a pension leaves "little room for debate that retirees'
health benefits vest upon retirement." 74
Tackett could not have been more insistent that "ordinary"
contract principles must govern the interpretation of CBAs: "As an
initial matter, Yard-Man violates ordinary contract principles by placing
a thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits in all
64. Noe v. PolyOne, Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 568 (6th Cir. 2008) (Sutton, J., dissenting) ( what
we continually disclaim presuming we continually seem to presume ).
65. Reese v. CNH America, LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 2009).
66. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435.
67. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq. (2012).
68. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435 (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S.
448, 456-57 (1957)).
69. Id. at 438 (quoting Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 934-35 (citing Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 1985)).
72. Id. at 937.
73. Id. at 936.
74. Noe v. PolyOne, 520 F.3d 548, 558 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting McCoy v. Meridian Auto.
Sys., Inc., 390 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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collective-bargaining agreements. That rule has no basis in ordinary
principles of contract law 75
Tackett disagreed that the "inferences applied in Yard-Man and
its progeny represent ordinary principles of contract law 76 Citing Story
and Williston, Tackett held that Sixth Circuit decisions requiring a
durational clause specific to retiree benefits to prevent vesting
"distort the text of the agreement and conflict with the principle of
contract law that the written agreement is presumed to encompass the
whole agreement of the parties." 77
Tackett cited Corbin to show that the Sixth Circuit "misapplied
other traditional principles of contract law, including the illusory
promises doctrine" and "failed even to consider the traditional
principle that courts should not construe ambiguous writings to
create lifetime promises." 78 Tackett noted the Sixth Circuit's differing
treatment of collectively bargained and non-collectively bargained
retiree healthcare benefits.79 The Sixth Circuit had held that, for noncollectively bargained benefits to vest, the intent of the parties to be
"stated in clear and express language." 80 From this, Tackett
concluded: "The different treatment of these two types of
employment contracts only underscores Yard Man's deviation from
ordinary principles of contract law 81
Tackett held that the Sixth Circuit's decision82 was tainted by
Yard-Man and its progeny.83 It stated: "We reject the Yard-Man
inferences as inconsistent with ordinary principles of contract law 84
But, the Court remanded the case for the "court to apply ordinary
principles of contract law in the first instance." 85
Justice Ginsberg, writing the four-justice concurrence, agreed
that ordinary contract principles, shorn of presumptions," apply to
CBAs, citing other portions of Williston for those " ordinary"rules.86
II

II

II

II

II

75. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 438 (emphasis added).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 440 (emphasis added) (citing 1 W. Story, Law of Contracts § 780 (M. Bigelow ed.,

5th ed. 1874) and 11 Williston § 31:5).
78. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 3 Williston § 7.7 (4th ed. 2008); 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 553, p. 216 (1960)).
79. Id. at 441.
80. Id. (quoting Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 400 (6th Cir. 1998).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 733 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2013).
83. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 442.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 443 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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The concurrence identified additional interpretative rules relevant to
the vesting inquiry.87 It emphasized that the majority opinion did not
require "clear and express" evidence of vesting and noted that CBA
language tying healthcare benefits to pensions, while not conclusive,
was nevertheless relevant to ascertaining the parties' intent. 88
B. CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese
Nearly three years after Tackett, on February 20, 2018, the
Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision, CNH Industrial N.V. v.
Reese,89 summarily reversing the Sixth Circuit's post-Tackett decision
in favor of a class of about four thousand retirees and spouses. 90
Based on the certiorari petition alone, the Court decided that retiree
healthcare benefits did not survive the expiration of the CBA under
which the retiree class members had retired.91 The Supreme Court
saw this, "[s]horn of Yard-Man inferences," as Ga "straightforward"
issue, one that required no briefing and oral argument on the
merits.92
The Court began its analysis by stating: "This Court has long
held that collective-bargaining agreements must be interpreted
'according to ordinary principles of contract law, quoting Tackett
for that premise throughout the decision.93 In particular, Reese
quoted Tackett's reference to Story and Williston for "the principle of
contract law that the written agreement is presumed to encompass
the whole agreement of the parties."94
Obscured by the Supreme Court's laser focus on supposed
"ordinary" contract principles is Tackett's disclaimer that ordinary
principles of contract interpretation apply to CB As "at least when
those principles are not inconsistent with federal labor policy." 95
Tackett cited Lincoln Mills96 for this proposition, but did not further
111

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
Id. at 443-444 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).
Id. at 763, 766-67; Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Ex F, Plaintiffs Expert
Report of Mark Lynne at 10, Reese v. CNH America LLC, 04- 70592 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14,
2014), ECF No. 419-19.
91. Reese, 138 S. Ct. at 763, 766-67.
92. Id. at 766-67.
93. Id. at 763 (quoting M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 435 (2015)).
94. Id.
95. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435.
96. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).

2019]

WHERE THE LAW ENDS

153

address this concept.97 Reese relegated Lincoln Mills to a parenthesis
after its citation to Tackett and deleted any reference to federal labor
policy.98 Instead, as noted, Reese asserted that the Court "has long
held" that CBAs "must'' be construed '" according t o ordinary
principles of contract law."' 99
Thus, in Reese, even the passing reference to "federal labor
policy" in Tackett had been airbrushed from judicial consideration,
without so much as an ellipsis to mark its passing. Worse, Tackett
and Reese failed to acknowledge the very basic, and previously
settled, concept of federal labor policy that collective bargaining
agreements are not ordinary contracts.100
Citing the 1874 version of Story on Contracts as applicable to
CBAs101 although CBAs did not become enforceable in federal
courts until 1947102 - demonstrates the present Supreme Court's
unfamiliarity with, or disregard for, federal labor policy. Unlike
"ordinary" contracts, a mature CBA is far more than its written terms.
A CBA is the amalgamation and evolution of hundreds of diverse
terms and conditions of employment, a process that often takes
decades and many CBAs to develop.103 Under federal labor policy,
a CBA is intended to be one in a continuing series of such agreements
between an employer and the labor organization chosen by the
employees. Many of the governing rules and standards are
determined by the day to day workplace practices developed over
years and decades rather than by the unadorned written words of
the most recent agreement.104
These issues have been extensively addressed by the Supreme
Court in landmark decisions decisions that both Tackett and Reese
completely ignored. Those decisions will now be addressed.
IV. BEFORE TACKETT A CBA "IS NOT AN ORDINARY CONTRACT
. . ., NOR IS IT GOVERNED BY THE SAME OLD COMMON-LAW

97. See Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435.
98. Reese, 138 S. Ct. at 763.
99. Id.
100. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
101. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 440.
102. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(2012), provided that federal district courts had jurisdiction over disputes between
employers and union arising under collective bargaining agreements.
103. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578-80.
104. Id.
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CONCEPTS

A. Lincoln Mills and the Development of Federal Common
Law Governing CBAs
In the National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935,105 Congress
established federal labor policy favoring collective bargaining as the
means of ensuring industrial stability.106 Section 9 provided that
labor organizations elected by employees would be the exclusive
bargaining representatives in negotiations with their employer. 107
The Act, as amended and expanded by the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947,108 established a duty for the employer and
certified union to bargain in good faith to reach a collective
bargaining agreement.109 The expiration of a particular CBA does not
terminate the relationship between the parties.110 To the contrary,
federal law requires that the parties bargain in good faith about
"mandatory" subjects of bargaining to reach a successor agreement
and, while bargaining, maintain existing terms and conditions of
employment until they reach agreement or an impasse, even after the
expiration of the existing CBA.111 The failure of either party to do so
is an unfair labor practice.112
In 1957, Lincoln Mills held that Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act "authorizes federal courts to fashion a
body of federal law for the enforcement of . . . collective bargaining
agreements." 113 Three years later, the Court decided several cases
doing just that fashioning federal law under Section 301 for the
enforcement of contracts.
In early 1960, the Supreme Court decided Lewis v. Benedict Coal
Corp.114 There, a mine operator withheld contributions owed under
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement to a jointly
administered welfare benefit fund to offset damages caused by the

105. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012)).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 159.
108. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
109. 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (2012).
110. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991).
111. Id. at 198-99.
112. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(5), (b)(3).
113. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
114. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960).
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union's violation of the CBA' s no strike clause. 115 The Supreme Court
addressed two questions: first, whether the union's performance was
a condition precedent of the operator's promise to pay into the fund;
and second, whether the operator had a valid counterclaim against
the fund, a third-party beneficiary to the CBA.116
After deciding against the operator on the first issue, the Court
reviewed the status of contract law on the latter issue.117 Citing
Corbin for the proposition that it "may perhaps, be regarded as just''
to allow the promisor to assert counter-claims against the beneficiary
as well as the promise,118 the Supreme Court found such a result
acceptable only if courts inferred an intention of the principle
contracting parties that the third-party's rights were so limited. 119
While, according to the Court, this suggestion of an inference "has
not been crystallized into a rule of construction," the Court
considered whether it was appropriate to infer such a rule in the
context of the contract before it.120 The Court declined to do so,
stating: "This collective bargaining agreement, however, is not a
typical third party contract. The promisor' s interest in the third party
here goes far beyond the mere performance to that third party . . 121
The Court identified that the employer's interest is rooted in the
"commonplace of modem industrial relations for employers to
provide security for employees and their families to enable them to
meet problems arising from unemployment, illness, old age or
death." 122 Citing Lincoln Mills for its authority to fashion federal law
under Section 301, the Court held, based on the several
considerations it discussed, including federal labor policy, that
parties to a CBA must agree in unequivocal language before the
union's breach of its promises under a CBA give rise to an employer's
II

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 460-62.
Id. at 466-67.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 466-67 (quoting 4 Corbin, Contracts § 819). The Court using the term
counterclaim and setoff may be confusing in the context of a third-party beneficiary
contract. As to a two-party contract for promises to pay money, the modern practice was
for the promisor to offset[] the damages he has sustained against the amount he owes . . .
rather than be required to bring a separate action for damages. Id. at 467.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 468.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Court also noted that the CBA at issue was an industry wide-CBA and if
employers generally reduce their contributions to the Fund based on damages claims
against the union, the burden would fall on employees and their families. Id. at 469.
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defense against a duty owed to the third-party welfare fund.123
In dissent, Justice Frankfurter agreed that CBAs were not
ordinary contracts, but thought it inappropriate to disregard all the
"governing rules pertaining to contracts." 124 He stated that those
ordinary rules already "recognize the diversity of situations in
relation to which contracts are made and duly allow for these variant
factors in construing and enforcing contracts." 125 He continued:
"And so, of course, in construing agreements for the reciprocal rights
and obligations of employers and employees, account must be taken
of the many implications relevant to construing a document that
governs industrial relations." 126
Justice Frankfurter found this to be no reason for jettisoning
ordinary contract principles when they "are as relevant to the law's
attitude in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements as
they are to contracts dealing with other affairs, even giving due
regard to the circumstances of industrial life and to the libretto that
this furnishes in construing collective bargaining agreements." 127 He
ended by quoting Archibald Cox, "one of our most experienced
students of labor law," for the proposition that, just because CBAs
have many characteristics that "preclude the application of the
familiar principles of contracts and agency," it would nevertheless
be unwise to "discard all precepts of contract law," because many of
those principles represent "an accumulation of wisdom, . .
bottomed upon notions of fairness and sound public policy." 128
A few months later, the Supreme Court, in three seminal cases
known as the Steelworker Trilogy,129 addressed the special nature of
collectively bargained contracts in the context of arbitration. In
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,130 the
Court explained the fundamental difference between a labor contract
and a commercial contract:
The collective bargaining agreement . . . is more than a
contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 470-71.
Id. at 475 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 475-76.
Id. at 476 (quoting Archibald Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
57 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1958)).
129. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter.
Wheel & Car. Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 594-96 (1960).
130. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. . . . The
collective agreement covers the whole employment
relationship. It calls into being a new common law the
common law of a particular industry or of a particular
plant.131
The Court expounded on that principle, by again quoting
Archibald Cox, albeit from a later article:
. . [I]t is not unqualifiedly true that a collective-bargaining
upon which the claim is founded. There are too many
people, too many problems, too many unforeseeable
contingencies to make the words of the contract the
exclusive source of rights and duties. One cannot reduce all
the rules governing a community like an industrial plant to
fifteen or even fifty pages. Within the sphere of collective
bargaining, the institutional characteristics and the
governmental nature of the collective-bargaining process demand
a common law of the shop which implements and furnishes the
context of the agreement. We must assume that intelligent
negotiators acknowledged so plain a need unless they
stated a contrary rule in plain words.' 132
The Court noted that in other kinds of contracts, parties enter
contracts voluntarily, in the sense that there is no compulsion to deal
with one another, as opposed to dealing with other persons.133 The
collective bargaining relationship is different because it exists by
force of federal statute; the employer cannot choose with whom to
contract. And, a "mature labor agreement may attempt to regulate
all aspects of the complicated relationship, from the most crucial to
the most minute over an extended period of time." 134 Because of the
''breadth of the matters covered, as well as the need for a fairly
concise and readable instrument," a CBA will contain a variety of
provisions, some fairly objective and detailed and others "more or
less specific" that "require reason and judgment in their
application." 135 According to the Court, " industrial common law the
practices of the industry and the shop is equally a part of the collective
bargaining agreement although not expressed in it 136
II

131. Id. at 578-79.
132. Id. at 579-80 (emphasis added) (quoting Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor
Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1498-99 (1959)).
133. Id. at 580.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 581-82 (emphasis added).
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In United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing
Co.,137 another of the Steelworker Trilogy, the Court held that a state
court's "preoccupation with ordinary contract law," that is, reliance
on the supposed plain me aning of a CBA, "could have a crippling
effect on grievance arbitration." 138 Justice Brennan wrote in his
concurring opinion to all three Trilogy decisions: "Words in a
collective bargaining agreement, rightly viewed by the Court to be
the charter instrument of a system of industrial self-government, like
words in a statute, are to be understood only by reference to the
background which gave rise to their inclusion." 139
Warrior & Gulf Navigation addressed the role of arbitrators in the
collective bargaining system,140 but the nature and meaning of a
CBA, and the intent of the parties to a CBA, do not change depending
on the forum in which that agreement is construed and enforced. 141
The lesson of Warrior & Gulf Navigation is certainly that when courts
undertake to interpret CBAs, they must immerse themselves in the
law of the shop to correctly perform their interpretive function of
determining the parties' intent. Courts must undertake this
heightened responsibility because they lack the "same experience
and competence" that labor arbitrators bring to the determination of
what the labor agreement means.142
The Supreme Court decided a series of cases based on these
principles. In 1964, the Court decided John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston,143 where it held that a successor employer was bound to
arbitrate a dispute with a union under a CBA to which it was not a
party.144 Citing Warrior & Gulf Navigation, the Court stated "While the
principles of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a
contract an unconsenting successor to a contracting party, a

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
Id. at 566-67.
Id. at 570 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574.
In Senior v. NSTAR Electric & Gas Corp., 449 F.3d 206, 220 (1st Cir. 2006), the First
Circuit stated that the rule enunciated by Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. is not simply a
rule about the power of arbitrators. The rule has been recognized and used by courts,
including the Supreme Court, as substantive law of labor contract interpretation. As the
Court stressed in NLRB v. Strong, [a]rbitrators and courts are still the principal sources of
contract interpretation. 393 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1969); Accord Litton Fin. Printing Div. v.
NLRB., 501 U.S. 190 (1991).
142. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581-582.
143. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
144. Id. at 548.
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collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract." 145
In 1966, in Transportation-Communication Employees v. Union
Pacific R. Co.,146 the Court employed these principles to decisions of
the National Railroad Adjustment Board, stating:
A collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary
contract for the purchase of goods and services, nor is it
governed by the same old common-law concepts which
control such private contracts.'. . . [I]t is a generalized code
to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsman cannot
wholly anticipate. . . . The collective agreement covers the
whole employment relationship. It calls into being a new
common law
the common law of a particular industry
or of a particular plant.'. . .In order to interpret such an
agreement it is necessary to consider the scope of other
related collective bargaining agreements, as well as the
practice, usage and custom pertaining to all such
agreements.147
In DelCostello v. Teamsters,148 the Supreme Court held that the
federal statute of limitations for unfair labor practices, rather than
state limitations periods, was applicable to Section 301 breach of
contract and duty of fair representation claims.149 The Court
explained that when the federal policies at stake are not in line with
state law, "[w]e have not hesitated to tum away from state law." 150
The Court continued:
As Justice Goldberg cautioned, '[I]n this Court's fashioning
of a federal law of collective bargaining, it is of the utmost
importance that the law reflect the realities of industrial life
and the nature of the collective bargaining process. We
should not assume that doctrines evolved in other contexts
will be equally well adapted to the collective bargaining
process. 151
In Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service,152 the Court addressed the issue
of apportioning damages in a hybrid breach of contract and duty of
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 550.
Transp.-Commc n Emp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157 (1966).
Id. at 160-61 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
Id. at 166.
Id. at 172.
151. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 358 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., concurring)).
152. Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
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fair representation action brought by a discharged employee against
his employer.153 In defining the interests implicated, the Court cited
Warrior & Gulf Navigation for the proposition that a CBA "is more
than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases
which the draftsman cannot wholly anticipate." 154 The Court then
continued: "In defining the relationships created by such an
agreement [a CBA], the Court has applied an evolving federal
common law grounded in national labor policy." 155
In NRLB v. Bildisco,156 the Court, citing John Wiley & Sons and
Warrior & Gulf Navigation, agreed with the courts of appeals that the
"special nature of a collective-bargaining contract, and the
consequent 'law of the shop' which it creates," required different
treatment in bankruptcy compared to executory contracts.157 In
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executive Ass'n,158 a 1989
decision involving a dispute over the employer's unilateral
implementation of drug testing,159 the Court quoted much of the
above from Transportation Employees including the passage that
CBAs are not "governed by same old common-law concepts which
control such private contracts" - for the proposition that "it is well
established that the parties' 'practice, usage and custom' is of
significance in interpreting their agreement." 160 The Court agreed
that the employer's contractual claim, resting "solely upon implied
terms of the CBA, as interpreted in light of past practice," was
"neither frivolous nor obviously insubstantial and for that reason,
[the] controversy [was] properly deemed a minor dispute within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the [Railway Labor] Board." 161
Warrior & Gulf Navigation162 is the seminal case for
understanding the unique nature of collective bargaining
agreements, how they differ from commercial contracts, and how
they must therefore be properly construed in the context of the
"common law" of the "particular industry" and the "particular
153. Id. at 214.
154. Id. at 224 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,

578 (1960)).
155. Id. at 224-25 (citing United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960);
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957)).
156. NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
157. Id. at 524
158. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executive Ass n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989).
159. Id. at 300-01.
160. Id. at 311.
161. Id. at 312.
162. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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plant." 163 By ignoring Warrior & Gulf Navigation, and the line of cases
affirming its concept of federal labor policy, the Supreme Court in
Tackett and Reese ignored as well the established principle that CBAs
are not "ordinary" contracts. Tackett and Reese imposed ordinary
rules of contract interpretation on CBAs even though the Supreme
Court had previously held, in Transportation Employees, that "the
same old common-law concepts which control . . . private contracts"
do not apply to CBAs.164
Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy, who joined Justice Thomas'
majority opinion in Tackett,165 had joined the majority opinion in
Consolidated Rail in 1989.166 Both had separately stressed the
importance of the doctrine of stare decisis.167 Still, at oral argument in
Tackett, Justice Scalia revealed a breathtaking lack of understanding
of the federal labor policy issues involved and a total disregard for
the precedent he endorsed in Consolidated Rail:
You know, the nice thing about a contract case of this sort
is you can't fe el bad about it. Whoever loses deserves to
lose. (Laughter) I mean, this thing is obviously an
important feature. Both sides knew it [the issue of vesting]
was left unaddressed, so, you know, whoever loses
deserves to lose for casting this upon us when it could have
been said very clearly in the contract. Such an important
feature. So I hope we'll get it right, but, you know, I can't
feel bad about it.168
No one was asking any Justice to "feel bad" about who wins and

163. Id. at 579.
164. Transp.-Commc n Emp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 160-61 (1966). Of

course, whether the Court applied ordinary rules of contract interpretation to the CBAs
in Tackett (and Reese) is itself debatable. See generally Robert A Hillman, The Supreme Court s
Application of Ordinary Contract Principles to the Issue of the Duration of Retiree Healthcare
Benefits Perpetuating the Interpretation/Gap-Filling Quagmire, 32 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 299,
310 (2017); Tex Pasley, Ordinary Principles of Contract Interpretation v. Ordinary Principles of
Contract Interpretation: The Future of Retiree Healthcare Benefits After M&G Polymers v. Tackett,
24 VA. J. SOC. POL Y & L. 125 (2017). But, that question goes beyond the scope of this article.
165. See M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 429 (2015).
166. Consol. Rail Corp., 491 U.S. at 299.
167. See notes 39-42, supra.
168. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S.
427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).
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who loses.169 Tackett presented a legal not an equitable issue.170 The
basic function of the Supreme Court is to get the legal issues right
and to correctly apply the Court's precedential decisions to those
issues. In any contract case, the basic role of the courts is to determine
and enforce the intent of the parties at the time they contracted, not
to erect artificial barriers to a full understanding what the parties
meant.171
When the contract involved is a collective bargaining
agreement, and federal labor policy is involved, the same-old rules
of who wins and who loses in a commercial contract dispute do not
govern.172 The terms of a CBA are not limited to what is "said very
clearly" in the written document because the written CBA is not the
entire agreement. The intent of the parties as to the employer's
obligation for retiree healthcare benefits may be unclear, that is,
ambiguous in the written CBA, but "very clear" from the decades
that obligation was in existence. When a CBA is before a court, the
inquiry into the parties' intent involves far more than an examination
of the written document.173 When the Court issued Warrior & Gulf
169. Justice Breyer responded to Justice Scalia: Well, you know, the workers who
discover they ve been retired for five years and don t have any health benefits might feel
a little bad about it. Id. at 22. But Justice Breyer himself apparently never learned that
Warrior & Gulf Navigation refuted Justice Scalia s erroneous and limited view of the nature
of the contract before the Court that is, that parties had to say things very clearly in
a CBA for an obligation to arise.
170. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002) (Scalia, J.)
(claim for money due under contract is an action at law).
171. Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. Cal., 813
F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. v. GTE Mobilnet, Inc., 281
F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir.2002) ( [T]he fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to give
effect to the mutual intent of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting. ); Liberty
Nat l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat l Trust & Sav. Ass n, 218 F.2d 831, 840 (10th
Cir. 1955) ( [T]he basic rule of universal acceptation for the ascertainment of [the parties]
intention is for the court, so far as possible, to put itself in the place of the parties when
their minds met upon the terms of the agreement. . .. ) (alteration in original); 11 SAMUEL
WILLISTON AND RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §30:6 at 108 (4th ed.
2012)( [T]he underlying goal in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intent of the
parties, and the surrounding circumstances when the parties entered the contract, among
other relevant considerations, may well shed light on that intent ).
172. Transp.-Commc n Emp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 160 (1966).
173. This article is not about the substance of the CBAs involved or about whether the
Court accurately applied ordinary rules of contract interpretation to those CBAs. That
topic is for another time. But, in Reese, when the language relating to retiree healthcare
benefits was first agreed upon in 1971, the employer s chief benefit negotiator wrote a
letter to every retiree informing them that, if the retiree died first, the retiree s surviving
spouse would have healthcare for the remainder of her lifetime. This promise was
repeatedly reiterated by the employer over the next quarter of a century. See Brief for Fox
Retiree Committee et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, M&G Polymers USA,
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as it understood the
Navigation in 1960, it understood this
complexity of understanding and interpreting the meaning of the
provisions of a CBA, informed as they are by the common law of the
industry and the shop.
This is where Tackett and Reese so utterly failed. If, as Warrior &
Gulf Navigation held, "industrial common law - the practices of the
industry and the shop is equally a part of the collective bargaining
agreement although not expressed in it," how can it be, as Tackett and
Reese declared, that "the written agreement is presumed to
encompass the whole agreement of the parties?" 174 In Tackett and
Reese, the Court adopted a presumption directly contrary to Supreme
Court precedent, a presumption that precludes any judicial
determination of what a collective bargaining agreement actually
consists of and thus what its individual provisions actually mean.
In furtherance of its new presumption, Tackett criticized the
Sixth Circuit for not heeding "the traditional principle that
'contractual obligations will cease, in the ordinary course, upon
termination of the bargaining agreement. 175 There, the Court
quoted Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB.176 Tackett also quoted
Litton for the proposition that "'a collective bargaining agreement
[may] provid[e] in explicit terms that certain benefits continue after
the agreement's expiration. 177 But, Tackett stated: "when a contract
is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer
that the parties intended those benefits to vest for life." 178
Tackett omitted two critical sentences from Litton.179 Those
sentences are: "Exceptions are determined by contract interpretation.
Rights which accrued or vested under the agreement will, as a
general rule, survive termination of the agreement." 180 And, the
111

111

LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).
174. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581-82; Tackett, 574 U.S. at 440; CNH Indus.
N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 763 (2018)
175. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 441-442 (quoting Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190,
207 (1991)).
176. Litton, 501 U.S. 190. In Litton, the issue was whether courts owed deference to the
National Labor Relations Board s interpretation of a CBA. The Court held that it did not,
because [a]rbitrators and the courts, rather than the Board, are the principal sources of
contract interpretation under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. Id. at
202.
177. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 441-442 (alteration in original) (quoting Litton, 501 U.S. at 207).
178. Id. at 442.
179. See Tackett, 574 U.S. at 441-442; But see Litton, 501 U.S. at 207.
180. Litton, 501 U.S. at 207. In fact, despite Tackett s criticism, the Sixth Circuit had already
fully addressed the principles set forth in Litton. In Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d
648 (6th Cir. 1996), the Sixth Circuit rejected Kelsey-Hayes argument, based on Litton, that
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Tackett concurrence quoted from an earlier passage in Litton for the
proposition that "'[C]onstraints upon the employer after the
expiration date of a collective-bargaining agreement' . . may be
derived from the agreement's 'explicit terms,' but they 'may arise as
well from the . . . implied terms of the expired agreement."' 181
To highlight the obvious, Tackett's inclusion of "explicit'' and
omission of "implied" distorts Litton's point, which was entirely
consistent with the same point in Transportation Employees,
Consolidated Rail and Warrior & Gulf Navigation.182 Terms of a CBA
may be implicit in the written agreement, and properly derived from
customs, usages and practices because this "common law" of the
industry and the shop "is equally a part of the collective bargaining
agreement although not expressed in it."183
Examples such as this illuminate that something other than
ignorance of precedent was at work. Another illustration is Tackett's
quotation from Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. ,184 coming
immediately after its citation to Lincoln Mills, as support for the
proposition that in interpreting CBAs "the parties' intentions
control." 185 What is interesting is that the "endeavor" in Stolt-Nielsen
was not the interpretation of CBAs, but the issue of whether
language in a commercial arbitration clause, interpreted under the
Federal Arbitration Act,186 permitted "class" arbitration of
commercial disputes.187
When there are several existing Supreme Court cases that
directly address labor arbitration under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act, including the
entire Steelworker Trilogy, as well as John Wiley & Sons and
Transportation Employees, the use of Stolt-Nielsen as the first citation
after Lincoln Mills is an odd choice, even for an unremarkable

retirees must prove an express agreement to vest. Id. at 655. The Sixth Circuit noted that
Kelsey-Hayes ignored the same two sentences of Litton that are missing from Tackett s
discussion. Id
181. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 443 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting
Litton, 501 U.S. at 207).
182. See Litton, 501 U.S. at 202, 203, 209 (citing both Lincoln Mills and Warrior & Gulf
Navigation in its discussion of the federal law applicable to the interpretation of CBAs).
183. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)
(emphasis added). Also see Tackett, 135 U.S. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (alteration in
original) (quoting Litton, 501 U.S. at 207).
184. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
185. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435.
186. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §1 et seq. (2019).
187. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 666, 667.
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principle that the goal of contract interpretation is to discern the
parties' intent. It is more so because the holding in Stolt-Neilsen has
nothing to do with interpreting CBAs the issue before Tackett.
There is no doubt, for instance, that union grievances under CBAs
often address issues affecting a group or class of employees. The
union is, after all, the "collective" bargaining agent of all employees
in the bargaining unit.
Further, Supreme Court decisions on arbitration under a CBA,
as noted, take a far more expansive view of what the "contract''
between the parties is and how the parties' intent is disclosed; the
CBA is not limited to the written words of the document and the
parties' intent can only by discerned by examining the common law
of the industry and shop as well. What is interesting, if perhaps
insignificant in analyzing how Tackett came to be decided, is that, in
Stolt-Nielsen, the same justices who joined in Justice Thomas'
decision in Tackett, cited both Warrior & Gulf Navigation and John
Wiley & Sons for general principles relating to arbitration.188 Five
years later, when Warrior & Gulf Navigation and John Wiley & Sons
held the actual precedent for the precise issue before Tackett, the
same judges ignored those decisions.189 In other words, Warrior &
Gulf Navigation and John Wiley & Sons had not been erased from
Supreme Court history; just any precedential value they held as to
what constitutes a collectively bargained agreement under federal
labor policy.
Reese's appraisal is that the Court "has long held that collectivebargaining agreements must be interpreted 'according to ordinary
principles of contract law. 190 In this statement, supported only by
Tackett and a parenthetical citation to Lincoln Mills, Reese completely
re-writes the Court's historical r eliance on Lincoln Mills as requiring
it to hold that the opposite is true - that the "same old" rules of
contract law do not apply to CBAs. In fact, Reese goes much farther
than Justice Frankfurter thought wise in his considered but solitary
dissent in Benedict Coal. Even Justice Frankfurter, in fearing that all
ordinary contract principles would be abandoned in Section 301
inquiries, nevertheless understood that federal labor policy was
critical in understanding what CBAs are and how they are
111

188. Id. at 683 (citing Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581); Id. at 685 (citing
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (quoting John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)).
189. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 429; John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 544; Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. at 575.
190. CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 763 (2018) (quoting Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435).

166

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:2

interpreted.191
Reese, without explanation in a per curiam decision, abandoned
any and all pretense that federal labor policy is even relevant to the
interpretation of CBAs. According to Reese, CBAs, even those first
negotiated decades ago, now "must be interpreted 'according to
ordinary principles of contract law"' - period.192 This seems to be the
ultimate abnegation of the principles underlying stare decisis that
the Court, by not identifying past precedent, can unanimously
implement a legal standard that even a lone dissenter long ago had
rejected as inappropriate to the interpretation of CBAs.
It may be pertinent to point out here that, in citing Lincoln Mills,
Tackett got the nuance wrong. The focus of Lincoln Mills was not on
employing state law to interpret CBAs it was on encouraging
"judicial inventiveness" in fashioning substantive federal law to
effectuate federal labor policy, resorting to state law only if a court
determines that state law "will best effectuate federal policy." 193 This
is what Lincoln Mills held:
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits
under §301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion
from the policy of our national labor laws . . .. The Labor
Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some
substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may
not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the
penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack
express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at
the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that
will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness
will be determined by the nature of the problem. . . . Federal
interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. . . .
But state law, if compatible with the purpose of §301, may be
resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the
federal policy. . . . Any state law applied, however, will be
absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of
private rights.194
191. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 475-76 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See

also David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV.
663, 664 n.4 (1973). In discussing the evolution of Supreme Court decisions before and after
Lincoln Mills, Professor David Feller states that, after the Steelworker Trilogy, the effort to
construct a legal theory following conventional contract lines was largely abandoned. Id.
Until, that is, Tackett and Reese.
192. Reese, 138 S. Ct. at 763 (quoting Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435).
193. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
194. Id. at 456-57 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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So, Tackett got it wrong. But Reese, in stating that Tackett
" required" federal courts to interpret CBAs according to "ordinary
principles of contract law," and that the Supreme Court has "long
held" that CBAs " must" be so interpreted, 195 got it wrong and
backward. Before Tackett, the Supreme Court never held that federal
courts were required to apply ordinary principles of contract law.
And, Lincoln Mills held only that state law "may" be resorted to "if'
compatible with the purpose of Section 301.196 There is a critical,
unsubtle difference between words of mandate ("required" or
"must"), used in Reese, and words in Lincoln Mills that are conditional
and discretionary ("if" and "may").197
Even if read in isolation
without regard to subsequent
Supreme Court precedent holding that CBAs are not ordinary
contracts Lincoln Mills cannot be read to mandate the application of
ordinary contract law in the interpretation of CBAs. By recognizing
that a "range of judicial inventiveness" 198 will be needed to address
the myriad issues underlying federal labor policy, Lincoln Mills
necessarily rejects the notion that federal common law under Section
301 is confined to ordinary state law contract principles.
If this were not enough, both Tackett and Reese asserted, or at
least suggested, that the CBAs were "silent" as to the duration of
retiree healthcare.199 But, as the Tackett concurrence noted, the CBA
explicitly provided that retirees "receiving a monthly pension" were
eligible for retiree healthcare.200 When a retiree died, the surviving
spouse "will continue to receive [healthcare] benefits . . . until death
or remarriage." 201 These are durational provisions. While these
provisions may not be conclusive evidence of an intent to vest, they
belie the notion of "silence" as to duration. Indeed, as the four -justice
concurrence stated, those provisions are, at the very l east, "relevant
to this examination" on remand and in other cases. 202
195. Reese, 138 S. Ct. at 762-63 (emphasis added).
196. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
197. See, e.g., Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 789 (2018) (unlike prior statute, new statute

does not say may, it does not say reasonable, and it certainly does not say anything
about discretion. ).
198. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
199. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 441; Reese, 138 S.S Ct. at 766.
200. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 444 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
201. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see Brief of Respondents at 16-17, M&G Polymers
USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (No. 13-1010).
202. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 441, 444 (discussing the concept of silence in the context of the
traditional rule that ambiguous writings should not be construed to create lifetime
promises, (citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, §553, at 216 (1960)). Putting aside whether a
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The retirees and surviving spouses whose healthcare benefits
were at risk in Tackett are entitled to and receiving a vested, lifetime
pension and will be until they die. Tackett simply re-wrote the CBA,
ignoring relevant evidence of intent, and provided M&G Polymers
and other employers with a huge advantage in shedding its retiree
healthcare obligations, under the false premise the CBAs were silent
as to duration.
The damage done to retirees (and to federal labor law) was
immediate.203 In Gallo v. Moen Inc.,204 a post-Tackett decision, the Sixth
Circuit declined to review extrinsic evidence of the employer's intent
because "[t]he first and best way to divine the intent of the parties is
from the four corners of their contract and from traditional canons of
contract interpretation. . . . Absent ambiguity from this threshold
inquiry, no basis for going beyond the contract's four comers
exists." 205
Gallo's self-assured pronouncement is contrary to Warrior & Gulf
Navigation's holding that evidence of the common law of the shop evidence that is by definition outside the "four comers" of the
written CBA -is "equally a part of the [CBA] although not expressed
in it." 206 If the "four comers" of a CBA are not confined to the
"written" CBA, it is error to confine analysis of the meaning of a CBA
to the written text. But, this textual primacy concept in Tackett and

promise of healthcare until death or remarriage constitutes silence or contains an
ambiguity, retiree healthcare is hardly operative in perpetuity, the phrase Tackett quoted
from Corbin. By retirement, most of the retiree s lifetime has passed in childhood and
decades of adult work needed to qualify for the benefit. Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp.,
993 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating, the obligation for which the plaintiffs contend
in this suit is not perpetual, because retired people and their widows (or widowers) do not
live forever. Perhaps a reasonable time for the operation of the promise in the CBA is
that found in the CBA
until death or remarriage of the retiree s spouse.
203. After Tackett, only Tackett retirees survived in the Sixth Circuit. Reese summarily
reversed a post-Tackett decision in favor of retirees. Reese v. CNH America, LLC, 854 F.3d
877 (6th Cir. 2017). In Cole v. Meritor, Inc., 855 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2017), the Sixth Circuit
reversed itself on reconsideration, holding that a CBA that had previously
unambiguously provided for vested benefits, 549 F.3d 1064, 1075 (6th Cir 2008) after
Tackett, did not as a matter of law. In Watkins v. Honeywell International, Inc., 875 F.3d
312 (6th Cir. 2017), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court s dismissal based on Tackett.
After Reese, no panel has yet had the temerity to suggest that any employer ever intended
to vest benefits, regardless of previously probative evidence suggesting otherwise. See
Cooper v. Honeywell International, Inc., 884 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2018); Fletcher v. Honeywell
International, Inc., 892 F.3d 217 (6th Cir. 2018).
204. Gallo v. Moen Inc., 813 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2016).
205. Id. at 273-74.
206. Id. at 273; See also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582 (1960).
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Reese - ostensibly derived from "ordinary" principles of contract
interpretation rather than federal labor policy is now apparently
the law of the land, despite long standing, well-developed Supreme
Court precedent directly to the contrary.
B. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Vested Retirement Rights Cannot

be Altered Without the Pensioner's Consent
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Allied Chemical & Alkali
Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.207 The issue was whether the
employer's unilateral mid-term modification of the retiree healthcare
plan for employees already retired constituted an unfair labor
practice.208 The Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit, holding, inter alia,
that retirees were not employees within the statutory bargaining unit
and therefore, the union had no statutory duty to represent them in
bargaining.209 The Court also held that bargaining over the
healthcare benefits of employees already retired is a permissive,
rather than a mandatory subject of bargaining. 210 The Court
concluded, therefore, that the employer's mid -term modification of
retiree healthcare benefits was not an unfair labor practice.211
The Supreme Court stated in a footnote that its holding did not
leave the retirees without protection.212 To the contrary, the Court
observed, if their former employer changed their benefits without
their consent, the retirees would have a breach of contract claim
under Section 301:
Since retirees are not members of the bargaining unit, the
bargaining agent is under no statutory duty to represent
them in negotiations with the employer. . . . This does not
mean that when a union bargains for retirees which
nothing in this opinion precludes if the employer agrees
the retirees are without protection. Under established
contract principles, vested retirement rights may not be
altered without the pensioner's consent. The retiree,
moreover, would have a federal remedy under § 301 of the
207.
208.
209.
210.

Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.157 (1971).
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 160, 166, 188.
Id. at 185. Under the National Labor Relations Act, the employer and union have a
duty to bargain in good faith only as to mandatory subjects of bargaining. 29 U.S.C. §
158(d) (2012). Refusal to bargain about mandatory subject of bargaining is an unfair labor
practice; refusal to bargain about permissive subjects of bargaining is not. See, id.
211. Id. at 188.
212. Id. at 181 n.20.
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Labor Management Relations Act for breach of contract if
his benefits were unilaterally changed.213
Inherent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass is the concept that retiree
healthcare benefits could vest during the term of a CBA, even though
the CBA would, as a matter of course, expire. Also inherent is the
concept that if, before or after the CBA expired, the employer
changed those benefits, the retiree had an individual breach of
contract action under Section 301 to enforce vested rights in federal
court. Pittsburgh Plate Glass addressed retiree healthcare benefits in
the context of federal labor law and policy.214
In fact, Yard-Man's 1983 "contextual" inference, that is, one
based on "the context in which these benefits arose," was premised
on factors addressed in 1971 in Pittsburgh Plate Glass that retiree
benefits are a permissive subject of bargaining.215 In the same
context, Yard-Man's description of retiree healthcare benefits as being
typically understood as a form of delayed compensation echoes the
statement in Pittsburgh Plate Glass that: "To be sure, the future
retirement benefits of active workers are a part and parcel of their
overall compensation . . II 216 And Yard-Man's analysis that
employees would want assurances that their retirement benefits
would continue regardless of future agreements,217 echoes the
analysis in Pittsburgh Plate Glass of the dangers to retirees inherent in
the situation in which unions represented the conflicting interests of
current employees and retirees in future negotiations.218
Yard-Man found it is reasonable that employees would make
certain that they nailed down their retirement benefits before they
retire.219 Otherwise, the vagaries of future negotiations, and the
shifting balance of power between employer and union, would
deprive them of the contractual protection afforded in Pittsburgh

213. Id. (internal citations omitted).
214. Id. at 185.
215. UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983). This contextual

analysis was also based, at least in part, on Brennan s concurrence in American
Manufacturing. See, id. at 1479.
216. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 180.
217. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
218. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 180-82. There is an inherent conflict between the
interest and power of current employees, whom employers need for production and who
vote on CBAs, and retirees, whose value to the employer is past and who most often cannot
not vote on CBAs after retirement. The retirees' power is derived entirely from vested
contract rights earned prior to retirement.
219. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
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Plate Glass.220
Tackett discounted Yard-Man's reliance on the "context" of
collective bargaining, including the mandatory/permissive
dichotomy of bargaining. In doing so, Tackett did not mention
Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the case Yard-Man cited for that discussion.221
Tackett denigrated Yard Man's analysis of general termination
provisions222 without addressing the fact that its analysis was
necessarily derived from the Pittsburgh Plate Glass principle that
retiree benefits cannot be taken away in subsequent negotiations
without the retiree's consent- something that would happen only if
the then current CBA had expired. Tackett criticized Yard-Man's
discussion of retiree healthcare benefits as a form of delayed
compensation without ever mentioning that Yard-Man relied
expressly on Pittsburgh Plate Glass for that analysis.223
In dismissing the idea that retiree healthcare constituted
"delayed compensation," Tackett cited the definition in ERISA as
including plans resulting in "deferral of income" as pension plans,
whereas retiree healthcare benefit plans were welfare benefit
plans.224 Of course, Congressional policy as to which benefits
Congress intends to statutorily regulate and protect as "pension
benefits" says nothing about the understanding or intent of the
parties to a CBA. Indeed, the CBA language promising retiree
healthcare at issue in Reese was negotiated in 1971,225 years before
ERISA became effective.226 In any event, a "deferral of income" as
220. Id.
221. In Tackett, the Court discounted the fact that retiree healthcare was a permissive

subject of bargaining, stating that [p]arties, however, can and do voluntarily agree to
make retiree benefits a subject of mandatory collective bargaining. Indeed, the employer
and union in this case entered into such an agreement. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v.
Tackett, 574 U.S. at 439. That statement mirrors the argument of the National Labor
Relations Board in Pittsburgh Plate Glass that the bargaining over retiree benefits had
become an industrial practice. The Court s response then was that would at most . . .
reflect the interests of employers and employees in the subject matter as well as its
amenability to the collective-bargaining process; it would not be determinative. Common
practice cannot change the law and make into bargaining unit employees those who are
not. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 176. In any event, the issue of whether parties to
a CBA agreed to view retiree benefits as a mandatory subject simply changes the context
of the particular negotiations. And, if the agreement to do so came after the obligation had
come due, that agreement would not impact employees already retired and whose rights
had vested. See, id. at 180-181 n.20.
222. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 440.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (2012)).
225. Reese v. CNH America, LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 318 (6th Cir. 2009).
226. See generally, 29 U.S.C §1061 (Sept. 2, 1974) Employee Retirement Income Security
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defined by ERISA, means wages where the payment is deferred until
a later time to defer tax consequences.227 Congress needed a
definition for the benefit it was addressing but did not forever
prohibit the use of that term in common parlance to include other
postretirement benefits.
Before Tackett, the Supreme Court had never relied on ERISA to
determine what benefits might have "vested" or "accrued" u nder a
CBA. To the contrary, in Litton, decided 15 years after ERISA became
law, the Court understood that severance pay was considered a form
of "deferred compensation" that could vest under a CBA. 228 Litton
had this understanding despite the fact that, under ERISA,
"severance pay" and "supplemental retirement income payments,"
like retiree healthcare benefits, can be considered "welfare plans
rather than pension plans." 229
In 1990, nearly fifteen years after ERISA became effective, the
Financial Accounting Board established FASB 106, the rule that
requires private sector employers to disclose the present value of the
cost of retiree healthcare benefits.230 The Board explained:
The Board's conclusions in this Statement result from the
view that a defined postretirement benefit plan sets forth
the terms of an exchange between the employer and the
employee. In exchange for the current services provided by
the employee, the employer promises to provide, in
addition to current wages and other benefits, health and
other welfare benefits after the employee retires. It follows
from that view that postretirement benefits are not
gratuities but are part of an employee's compensation for
services rendered. Since payment is deferred, the benefits are a
type of deferred compensation. The employer's obligation for that
compensation is incurred as employees render the services
necessary to earn postretirement benefits.231
As employees, retirees viewed their retirement benefits, both
pensions and healthcare, as benefits they had earned through
Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829.
227. See ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2012).
228. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1991) (citing Nolde Brothers,
Inc. v. Bakery & Confect. Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243 (1977)). In Litton, the Court
disagreed that a seniority provision that included an aptitude requirement that could
change over time, was a form of deferred compensation. Id. at 210.
229. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1002(2)(B) (2012).
230. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, Summary of Statement No. 106 (Dec.
1990), http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum106.shtml.
231. Id. (emphasis added).
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decades of labor. Upon retirement, retirees understand the benefits
they have earned cannot be taken away. In many cases, employees
decide to retire early, or to take an early retirement package offered
by an employer, as many did in Reese, because they were uncertain
what might happen in future negotiations. They decided to retire
early to lock in the healthcare benefits promised in the then current
CBA.
Any employee who paid attention would scoff at the idea that
retiree healthcare benefits were anything but deferred compensation.
Employees understood that, in contract after contract, they received
a lower hourly wage because they were paying for retirement
benefits, including pension and retiree healthcare. Employers often
accounted for the cost of retiree healthcare and pensions and retiree
life insurance as a separate per-employee hourly cost and shared
that costing with the union in negotiations. Unions and employees
typically knew exactly how much per hour that the employer took
from their wages to pay for retiree healthcare benefits. Active
employees saw this cost as wages they were giving up in the present
so they would have healthcare benefits after retirement.
Having given up this hourly amount for tens of thousands of
hours during their employment, it is easy to understand why
employees knew that they earned healthcare during retirement.
And, since employers reinforced that idea prior to and at retirement,
it is difficult to fault them for understanding that they had earned
those benefits by working for decades at lower wages.
As noted, stare decisis is most important "in cases involving
property and contract rights, where reliance interests are
involved." 232 In both Tackett and Reese, the critical issue implicated
both the contract rights of retired employees and reliance issues
retirees worked for decades in reliance on long-standing, commonlyunderstood promises of healthcare for themselves and their spouse
during retirement. In this context, when the considerations
supporting stare decisis are at their "acme," 233 the failure of the Court
to even identify its precedent governing these matters is
incomprehensible.
Tackett excoriated Yard-Man's focus on "context" rather than
solely on the written words of the CBA, despite the fact that Warrior
& Gulf Navigation, stressed that the law of the shop which implements
and furnishes the context of the agreement" was equally if not more
11

232. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
233. Id.
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important than the written word.234 If "[w]ords in a collective
bargaining agreement . . . are to be understood only by reference to
the background which gave rise to their inclusion," as Justice
Brennan stated in American Manufacturing,235 Yard-Man was right to
look beyond the "ordinary rules" of contract law to fashion labor law
policy in the context of retiree healthcare benefits.
Yard-Man was an example of the use of "judicial inventiveness"
sanctioned by Lincoln Mills. Yard-Man was an attempt to fashion
federal law under Section 301 relating to third-party beneficiaries
(retirees), an area that Benedict Coal had long ago held was not subject
to the strictures of ordinary contract law, using contextual factors
identified by Pittsburgh Plate Glass as relevant to the inquiry.236 In
fact, Pittsburgh Plate Glass cited Benedict Coal for the proposition that
retirees had a direct action against their former employer for breach
of contract under Section 301 if their healthcare benefits were
unilaterally changed.237 Thus, there is a direct line from Lincoln Mills
to Benedict Coal to Pittsburgh Plate Glass to Yard-Man, precedent that
Tackett entirely missed or simply ignored.
Yard-Man may have been wrong in crafting a "status" inference,
or on other individual points, but Yard-Man was decided squarely
within existing Supreme Court law and relied directly on that
precedent for its holdings.238 Yard-Man was decided at a time when
234. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960)

(emphasis added).
235. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960).
236. It is in this context that, in rejecting Yard-Man s analysis of the illusory promise
doctrine, Tackett misses the point. Yard-Man was viewing the issue from the point of the
third-party beneficiary employee, not from the perspective of the contracting parties. If a
retiree is a third-party beneficiary to the CBA, and has an individual contract right under
Section 301, the issue is whether the employer s promise is illusory to that employee not
whether is illusory to every employee covered by the CBA. And, the employee s
consideration is performance, that is, the decades of work performed to qualify for the
employer s promise of retiree healthcare. See Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459,
498-99 (1960); UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1480-82 (6th Cir. 1983). Under
ordinary contract principles, [a]n illusory promise is one where the promisor is not
obligated to do anything in consideration of the other party s promise or performance.
Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carey Transp., Inc., 578 F. Supp.2d 888, 921 (W.D. Mich. 2008)
(quoting J&B Sausage Co. v. Dep t of Mgmt. & Budget, 2007 WL28409, *3 n.1 (Mich. App.
Jan. 4, 2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §77 (AM. LAW INST.), comment
a, page 195 (1981)).
237. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 180 n. 20
(1971).
238. Unlike Tackett and Reese, Yard-Man cited and relied on, not only Lincoln Mills, but
American Manufacturing, John Wiley & Sons, Transportation Employees and Pittsburgh Plate
Glass. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479, 1482. In his dissent to Part II of Yard-Man, addressing
the employer s purchase of annuities, District Judge Holschuh criticized the majority for
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that precedent was still fresh and when collective bargaining was
prevalent and relevant to the national dialogue. Tackett's wholesale
rejection of Yard-Man, without understanding and analyzing
without even identifying the precedent on which Yard-Man was
explicitly based, creates the suspicion that the Court intentionally
decided to ignore its prior precedent sub rosa and start anew,
undoing promises some 50 years after they were first made.
Tackett and Reese's wholesale disregard for its earlier decisions
establishing federal labor policy in the context of collective
bargaining and the unquestioning application of the "same old
common law" 239 contract concepts to CBAs undermines any rational
observer's confidence in anything the Supreme Court says or does in
any situation at any time. If the Supreme Court can do what it did to
retirees in Tackett and Reese, it surely can do whatever it wants,
whenever it wants, for whatever reason it deems expedient, in any
situation, to any citizen litigant. If stare decisis can be avoided by
simply ignoring precedent at the whim of the Court, stare decisis is, in
Justice Scalia's words, "no doctrine at all." 240 If this is so, then the
Constitutional and judicial protections against arbitrary decisionmaking have lost an essential common law safeguard.
V. WHAT WENT WRONG
It is unacceptable to assume that the Supreme Court of the
United States is collectively incompetent, is collectively ignorant or
lacks a collective memory. The Supreme Court is required to know
its own precedent and, under the doctrine of stare decisis, to follow
that precedent or explain why it has decided to change course.
Because the internal processes of the Supreme Court are shrouded in
secrecy and often are beyond the comprehension of the most
experienced lawyers, there must be enough transparency in the
Court's decisions to reveal the underlying rationale of a decision
whether it is based in reason, logic or experience.241 Otherwise, there
what he saw as on over-reliance on Michigan law of accord and satisfaction, citing Lincoln
Mills for the proposition that § 301 is governed not by state law but by federal substantive
law and that Lincoln Mills cautioned that courts are to utilize state law only if it is
compatible with the purpose of § 301 and only if it is the rule that will best effectuate the
federal policy. Id. at 1493 (citing and quoting Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of
Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)).
239. Transp.-Commc n Emp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 160-161 (1966).
240. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).
241. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co., 1881) ( The
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. ); SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST
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will be speculation that the Court acted for undisclosed reasons and
public confidence in the judiciary will be correspondingly weakened.
The Supreme Court currently has 36 law clerks, famously
selected for intellectual and educational excellence honed at
America's most elite law schools. One presumes that included in
their intellectual resumes and practical legal skills is the ability to
perform basic searches on legal databases. If, for example, a law
clerk had searched in Westlaw, using only the phrases "ordinary w /5
contract" and "collective w/5 bargaining," and limited the search to
the Supreme Court, that clerk would have instantly identified, not
only Lincoln Mills, but American Manufacturing, John Wiley & Sons,
Transportation Employees, Bowen, DelCostello, Bildisco and Consolidated
Rail,242 all of which stand for the proposition that CBAs are not
ordinary contracts and are not governed by the same old rules as
ordinary contracts. Today, if a law clerk types in the same search,
Tackett and Reese appear as the most recent cases, both with holdings
stating the exact opposite.243
Tackett relied heavily on Williston, citing the treatise seven times
for the "ordinary" rules of contract interpretation. 244 If the Court had
examined Williston more closely, it would have discovered that
Williston had a separate chapter on collective bargaining
agreements, which cited John Wiley & Sons and Warrior & Gulf
Navigation, respectively, for the proposition that a CBA "'is not an
ordinary contract," but a '"generalized code to govern a myriad of
cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate."' 245
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, OR, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON:
NOT THE NAME OF A LAWYER ONELY, BUT OF THE LAW ITSELFE 130 (1628) ( [Reason] is the
life of the law. ); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) ( It is difficult to believe that reason, logic or experience could be marshalled
in support of such an assumption. ), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
242. Boolean Search for Supreme Court Cases, WESTLAW,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.
Default)&bhcp=1 (search (ordinary w/5 contract) & (collective w/5 bargaining) ; then
narrow Jurisdiction to Federal Supreme Court cases).
243. The justices and their law clerks could have found all the decisions relying on Lincoln
Mills authorization to use judicial inventiveness in fashioning federal labor law through
key notes searches or Shepardization of Lincoln Mills. See Boolean Search for Supreme
Court Cases, WESTLAW,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.
Default)&bhcp=1 (search (ordinary w/5 contract) & (collective w/5 bargaining) ; then
narrow Jurisdiction to Federal Supreme Court cases; sort results by date).
244. The majority cited Williston five times, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574
U.S. at 435, 438, 439, 440 (twice); the concurrence twice at 443.
245. 20 Williston on Contracts § 55.3 and notes 31, 33 (quoting Warrior & Gulf
Navigation, 363 U.S. at 579).
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The real issue was obscured by the thirty-year battle over the
Yard-Man inference that came to a head in Tackett. The circuit split
was not over the interpretation of Benedict Coal or Warrior & Gulf
Navigation, but over the validity of the Yard-Man status inference.
When the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari in Tackett, after
repeatedly refusing to do so in cases decided under Yard-Man,246
retiree lawyers understood that the Yard-Man "status inference" was
probably doomed. But, they did not necessarily contemplate that the
entire Yard-Man contract analysis, based on Lincoln Mills and using
contract principles to fashion federal common law, would be
obliterated as well.
One partial explanation for the lack of focus on governing
precedent may be the way Tackett came to the Supreme Court. In its
writ, M&G Polymers stated the Questions Presented as:
1. Whether, when construing collective bargaining
agreements in Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
cases, courts should presume that silence concerning the
duration of retiree health-care benefits means the parties
intended those benefits to vest (and therefore continue
indefinitely), as the Sixth Circuit holds; or should require a
clear statement that health-care benefits are intended to
survive the termination of the collective bargaining
agreement, as the Third Circuit holds; or should require at
least some language in the agreement that can reasonably
support the interpretation that health-care benefits should
continue indefinitely, as the Second and Seventh Circuits
hold.
2. Whether, as the Sixth Circuit has held in conflict with the
Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, different rules of
construction should apply when determining whether
health-care benefits have vested in pure ERISA plans
versus collectively bargained plans.247
246. See Moore v. Menasha Corp., 690 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 568 U.S. 1250

(2013); Bender v. Newell Window Furnishings, Inc., 681 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2012), cert denied
568 U.S. 943 (2012); Rose v. Volvo Const. Equip. N. Am., Inc., 331 Fed. Appx. 388 (6th Cir.
2009), cert. denied 559 U.S. 970 (2010); Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571
(6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1019 (2006); UAW v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d
768 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1067 (2000); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d
648 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 807 (1996); Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770
F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
247. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, M&G Polymers USA, LLC. v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427
(2015) (No. 13-1010). The Court limited its grant of certiorari to Question 1, M&G Polymers
USA, LLC. v. Tackett, 572 U.S. 1099 (2014). But the second issue impacted the briefs,
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This statement skews the discussion in a manner that deflects
attention from the real issue whether CBAs are ordinary contracts
that are governed by the same common law rules as ordinary
contracts. If the real issue had been stated in the first question, the
Court and the parties would have focused on the precedent
addressing that issue, and under existing precedent, the answer to
the second issue would have been apparent different rules do apply
to collectively bargained plans.
In Tackett, M&G Polymers and its supporting amici, including
the Chamber of Commerce and the American Manufacturing
Association, sought, not only the demise of the Yard-Man inference,
but a "clear statement'' rule under which retire es could win only if
the written CBA clearly and unambiguously provided for "lifetime"
or "vested" healthcare benefits. 248 They noted that the Sixth Circuit,
in Sprague v. General Motors Corp.,249 had applied such a rule under
ERISA to non-CBA retiree healthcare contracts.250 This line of attack
on Yard-Man understandably influenced the response. In their brief,
the Tackett Respondents rejected the way the Petitioner had framed
the Question Presented, but not because Petitioner's approach was
contrary to federal labor policy. Instead, they argued:
The answer to the question presented, thus framed as
whether the courts should follow alternative A, B, or C, is
"No." There is a fourth alternative, which has the virtues of
being both simpler and legally correct: to interpret
promises of this character through the traditional
principles of contract interpretation, just as the courts
interpret all other promises in CBAs.251
The Tackett Respondents cited John Wiley & Sons for the
proposition that a CBA "is 'not an ordinary contract, but only in
passing.252 They included a parenthetical quote from American
Manufacturing that "[S]pecial heed should be given to the context in
which collective bargaining agreements are negotiated and the
purpose they are intended to serve." 253 Respondents cited
111

argument and the Court s opinion.
248. Brief for the Petitioner, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010) [hereinafter
Petitioner s Brief].
249. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998).
250. Brief for National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 16-17, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).
251. Brief of Respondent at 19, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010) [hereinafter
Respondents Brief].
252. Id. at 20 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964)).
253. Id. at 20 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960)).
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Consolidated Rail only for the proposition that CBAs contain both
"express and implied terms" and that imposing a "clear and patent"
standard would delegate implied CBA terms to a "less favored"
status.254 Ironically, Respondents cited Transportation Employees for
the proposition that "traditional rules [of contract interpretation]
apply fully to the interpretation of CBAs," 255 rather than for the
actual holding of Transportat ion Employees that a CBA is "not an
ordinary contract" and is not governed by the "same old
common-law concepts which control such private contracts." 256
Respondents did not cite Warrior & Gulf Navigation or argue that
"industrial common law - the practices of the industry and the
shop - is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement
although not expressed in it." 257
In their brief and at oral argument, Tackett's counsel did not
defend the Yard-Man inference.258 Instead, at oral argument, Tackett's
counsel stated that the retirees would welcome a remand and would
prevail under ordinary contract principles, without reliance on any
Yard-Man inference.259
This author was also concerned that the Court might adopt the
employer's proposed "clear statement'' rule. As a result, he filed an
amicus brief on behalf of certain Retiree Committees formed in
connection with the settlement of the Yolton, Golden and Fox
litigation.260 In that brief, this author stressed a "clear statement'' rule
was inconsistent even with ordinary rules of contract interpretation,
and argued that those ordinary rules are aimed at determining the
actual intent of the parties and often require courts to look beyond
the written agreement, even when the language may appear to be
unambiguous.261
In the process, this author noted that a "clear statement'' rule
was also contrary to federal labor law, citing the Steelworker Trilogy
254. Id. at 22, (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass n, 491 U.S. 299,

308-309 (1989).
255. Id. at 39.
256. Transp.-Commc n Emp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 160-61 (1966).
257. See generally Respondents Brief, supra notes 246-249; United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
258. In its reply, the petitioner stated that [R]espondents try to put as much distance as
they can between Yard-Man and the judgment in this case. Reply Brief for Petitioners at
1, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).
259. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, 41, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427(2015) (No. 13 1010).
260. See Brief for Fox Retiree Committee et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).
261. Id. at 7-11.
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for that proposition.262 The author cited both Lincoln Mills and
Warrior & Gulf Navigation for the principle that CBAs are negotiated
in unique circumstances and assessed in the broader context of
federal labor policy.263 He quoted Justice Brennan's concurrence in
American Manufacturing that words in a CBA "can be understood
only by reference to the background which gave rise to their
inclusion." 264 But the focus of the amicus brief was intentionally on
"ordinary" contract principles rather than federal labor policy. 265
In another amicus brief supporting the Tackett retirees,266 the
Labor and Benefits Law Professors cited Groover v. Michelin North
America, Inc.,267 where retirees sued to enforce their collectivelybargained right to lifetime healthcare benefits.268 In Groover, the
district court cited Transportation Employees for the principle that "[a]
collective bargaining agreement, however, is not governed by the
same principles of interpretation as those that apply to private or
commercial contracts." 269 The district court held that federal labor
policy provided "considerably more latitude in considering extrinsic
evidence," not offered under ordinary contract law, in determining
the parties' contractual intent. 270
The Supreme Court did not have to rely solely on the parties'
briefs to discover its precedent. As noted above, Yard-Man itself cited
not only Lincoln Mills, but John Wiley & Sons, Transportation
Employees, and Justice Brennan's concurrence in American
Manufacturing about how collective bargaining agreements are
different from ordinary contracts.271 Yard-Man cited and relied
expressly on Pittsburgh Plate Glass for its contextual analysis.272 In his
dissent to Part II of Yard-Man, District Judge Holschuh cited Lincoln
Mills for the principle that "it is well settled that the enforcement of
[CBAs] under § 301 is governed not by state law but by federal
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 4-5, 8.
Id. at 8.
See Brief for Fox Retiree Committee et al. as Amici Curiae for the Respondents,
Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).
266. Brief of Labor and Benefits Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).
267. Id. at 6, n.3.
268. Groover v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
269. Id. at 1247.
270. Id.
271. UAW v. Yard-Man Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983), abrogated by M&G
Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015).
272. Id. at 1482.

2019]

WHERE THE LAW ENDS

181

substantive law." 273
None of this mattered. Yard-Man had to go. But, Yard-Man met
its demise in Tackett without any reference to the Supreme Court
precedent that informed Yard-Man.274 In the process, the federal
common law of Section 301, fashioned by reference to federal labor
policy, was entirely displaced by "ordinary contract principles." 275
Precedent developed over decades was ignored.
In the post-Tackett appeal in Reese, one of the retirees' principal
arguments to the Sixth Circuit was that Warrior & Gulf Navigation
required consideration of the common law of the shop as part of the
CBA.276 Both the majority and dissent ignored that argument. In its
per curiam decision, the Supreme Court summarily denied the Reese
retirees any opportunity to address pre-Tackett precedent on the
merits.277 In a stunning departure from pre-Tackett precedent, Reese
held that the Court had "long held" that CBAs "must" be interpreted
"'according to ordinary principles of contract law . 278
In hindsight, retiree advocates may have made what now
appear to be tactical misjudgments, in avoiding a full-throated
defense of Yard-Man and in not providing a more detailed and
vigorous discussion of federal labor policy and of Benedict Coal,
Warrior & Gulf Navigation and their progeny. But, counsel for the
retirees in Tackett had a duty only to their clients not retirees in
general and the Tackett retirees survived to fight another day.279 The
Court cannot rely on the parties to identify either the relevant issues
or the relevant precedent. The Supreme Court has broader duties
than to resolve any individual dispute; the Supreme Court owes
fidelity to the rule of law in general and to its precedent. 280 Given the
111

273. Id. at 1493 (Holschuh, J. dissenting).
274. This was the same precedent that had informed those employers who agreed in the

late-1960 s to provide healthcare benefits for retirees after the implementation of Medicare
had made it both inexpensive for them and desirable to employees. See generally Brief of
Labor and Benefits Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Tackett,
574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).
275. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.
276. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 25-31, Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V., 854 F.3d 877 (6th
Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2382).
277. CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 766-67 (2018).
278. Id. at 763.
279. Instead, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit. M&G Polymers
USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 442 (2015). The Sixth Circuit in turn remanded the case
to the district court for a determination of whether the healthcare benefits vested under
ordinary principles of contract law. Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 811 F.3d 204, 210
(6th Cir. 2015).
280. The impact of Tackett and Reese was immediate and devastating. Thousands of retirees
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circumstances at the time - the employer's push for a "clear
statement" rule - it is absurd to think that a different response from
the Tackett retirees or other amici would have made any difference,
particularly after Reese.
In Tackett and Reese, the Supreme Court, the ultimate guardian
of the law, reversed long-established precedent sub silentio,281 and did
so apparently intentionally. This is difficult to comprehend and
impossible to justify.
VI. A WHOLE NEW BALL GAME

Much has changed since the 1960's and 1970's, when the
seminal labor law decisions were issued. Globalization and
technology have changed the American industrial workplace
forever. Union membership has plummeted.282 Michigan, once the
arsenal of democracy and the heart of America's industrial
powerhouse, is now the heart of the rust belt.283 In 2013, Michigan's
Republican governor and Republican controlled legislature, the
result of gerrymandered legislative districts, turned the home of the
UAW into a Right to Work state.284
As a nation, what was long an industrial economy has become
largely a service economy.285 It is the exception rather than the norm
for any worker to be employed by a single employer throughout a

and their spouses lost their healthcare benefits as a result. See supra, note 202.
281. Defined as Under silence; without notice being taken; without being expressly
mentioned (such as precedent sub silentio). Sub Silentio, BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. Post 2014).
282. The percentage of unionized workforce peaked in 1954 at about 35%. GERALD
MAYER, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES CRS-11, Figure 1 & CRS-12
(2004). In 1983, it was 20.1 %, but by 2017 had fallen to 10.7%. Press Release, U.S. DEP T.
OF LABOR, Union Members 2017 (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01192018.pdf.
283. In Michigan, the unionized work force fell from 44.8% in 1964 to 14.7% in 2014.
Quoctrung Bui, 50 Years of Shrinking Union Membership, One Map, NPR (Feb. 23, 2015),
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/02/23/385843576/50-years-of-shrinking-unionmembership-in-one-map (When using the interactive map, adjust slider to 1964 and 2014
to see cited statistics).
284. See Mich. Comp. Law Ann. §423.17 (West 2019); Mich. Comp. Law Ann.
§423.209(2) (West 2019).
285. Reid Wilson, Watch the U.S. Transition from a Manufacturing Economy to a Service
Economy, in one GIF, WASH. POST (Sep. 3, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/03/watch-the-u-stransition-from-a-manufacturing-economy-to-a-service-economy-in-onegif/?utm_term=.76fbc0cf5f2b.
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career.286 As the nature of the workplace has changed, the
"portability and continuity" of healthcare benefits from job to job
have assumed greater significance and employer-sponsored
healthcare has declined.287
In the present economy, employers increasingly hire
individuals as "independent contractors" rather than employees.
Employers often provide fewer or no benefits to these contractors"
who often work alongside existing employees, doing the same tasks.
In the emerging gig economy, companies like Uber and Lyft have
"partners" rather than employees. These partners have the
"freedom" to work odd and long hours for low pay and no benefits
while using their own equipment and paying their own expenses. 288
Naturally, the owners of rideshare companies become billionaires
while the price of taxi medallions plummet.289
Well-meaning, well-educated elites offer ideas on how to
address the lack of collective power of lower and middle class
workers by, for example, "crea[ting] a new labor movement'' from a
"clean slate." 290 Collective bargaining to address this imbalance in
power is seen as and as currently structured may well be an
outmoded means of redress for the grievances of any worker (or any
"partner" or "independent contractor" or "colleague" or "associate"
or "intern").
Add to this the inexorable rise in the cost of healthcare,291 in
II

286. Press Release, U.S. DEP T OF LABOR, Employee Tenure in 2018 (Sep. 20, 2018),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm.
287. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. §1181
(2012).
288. See, e.g., Lawrence Mishel, Uber and the Labor Market, ECON. POLICY INST. (May 15,
2018),
https://www.epi.org/publication/uber-and-the-labor-market-uber-drivers-compensationwages-and-the-scale-of-uber-and-the-gig-economy.
289. See Nicole Goodkind, NYC Taxi Drivers are Killing Themselves, and Some Blame Uber
and Lyft, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://www.newsweek.com/uber-lyft-taxi-drivers-suicide-new-york-city-866994. ( A
taxi medallion, which allows a driver to operate his or her own cab instead of leasing
from others, peaked at $1 million in 2014 but is now worth less than $200,000. )
290. Sharon Block and Benjamin Sachs, This Labor Day, A Clean Slate for Reform, ON
LABOR (Sept. 3, 2018), https://onlabor.org/this-labor-day-a-clean-slate-for-reform; See also
Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L. J. 1, 2 (2016); Jay Youngdahl, Harvard Wants
to Save the Working Class, JACOBIN (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/10/clean-slate-labor-law-unions-janus.
291. According to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), U.S. healthcare
spending in 2017 was $10,739 per person, or $3.5 trillion nationally, or 17.9% of Gross
Domestic Product. CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., Historical,
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Report
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large part because private employers and government footed the bill
for so long
at the prodding of unions who sought benefit
improvements in every set of negotiations until the balance of power
tipped against them. During and beyond this era of healthcare
expansion, the private sector rushed to capitalize on the healthcare
market: insurance companies, drug companies, pharmacy benefit
managers, third-party administrators and layers of consultants,
many owned by private equity companies, all sought a larger piece
of the healthcare pie through mergers and acquisitions, 292 marketing
directed at consumers293 and physicians,294 more new (or newer
versions of) medical procedures, prescription drugs and products for
existing and newly identified ailments, and, of course, outright
fraud.295 The wages of healthcare and pharma CEOs have soared
whether or not profits did.296
Tension between rising provider income, on the one hand, and
attempts to control costs, on the other, has led to even more layers of
administration and administrative costs. Insurance providers offer
managed care or preferred provider plans intended to reduce costs
by encouraging participants to use "network" providers w ho accept
the "network" contract amount for their services. To counter this,
consultants offer healthcare providers services, for example, that
"defend your clinical decisions and capture proper compensation for
every billable service."297 In turn, other companies offer "re-pricing''
s/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (last visited May
14, 2019). In 1960, the healthcare cost per person was $146 per person, or $27.2 billion total,
for 5% of GDP. Id.
292. Kelly Gooch, Healthcare Mergers and Acquisitions: 6 Things to Know, BECKER S HOSP.
REVIEW (July 23, 2018),
https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactions-and-valuation/healthcaremergers-and-acquisitions-6-things-to-know.html.
293. Rebecca Robbins, Drug Makers now spend $5 billion a year on advertising. Here s what
that buys., STAT NEWS (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/09/drug-industry-advertising/.
294. Ana Swanson, Big pharmaceutical companies are spending far more on marketing than
research, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/11/big-pharmaceutical-comp
anies-are-spending-far-more-on-marketing-than-research/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e7
7104ae04a1.
295. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical industry gets high on fat profits, BBC NEWS (Nov. 6,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223.
296. Elizabeth Whitman, Healthcare and Pharma CEOs Paid More than Top Execs in Any
Other Industry, Analysis Finds, INT L BUS. TIMES (May 25, 2016),
https://www.ibtimes.com/healthcare-pharma-ceos-paid-more-top-execs-any-other-indust
ry-analysis-finds-2374013
297. BRAULT, Practice Solutions for Acute and Emergency Groups,
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services to negotiate and reduce, for a fee, "non-network" claims
submitted by doctors and hospitals outside the particular
"network. 298
Pharmacy Benefit Managers like Express Scripts, Optum, and
Caremark offer programs to plan sponsors intended to reduce the
costs of prescription drugs.299 Other consultants offer services
intended to gain bargaining leverage for plan sponsors and their
participants in negotiations with these PBMs.300 The continued
tension between soaring healthcare costs and attempts to manage
those costs adds layer after layer to the healthcare morass.
In this scenario, virtually no employer now offers retiree
healthcare for new employees; very few employers provide full
healthcare benefits for any employees. The trend has long been to
shift the rising costs to existing employees and to strictly limit what
is available to new hires. "Legacy" liabilities for employees longhttps://www.brault.us/services/?utm_source=bing&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=
digitalhyve&utm_content=braultcompetitorsbing&msclkid=48195dc3a77516b7f0e201ce8a
bd3228 (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
298. See e.g., H.H.C GROUP, Claims Negotiation and Repricing,
http://www.hhcgroup.com/claims-negotiation-and-repricing/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2019)
( HHC has established relationships with major national, regional, and local preferred
provider networks (PPOs). When our clients submit out-of-network claims, we can often
reprice the claims to the significantly lower, pre-negotiated rates which providers in
these networks have already agreed. )
299. Over the Years, PBMs, which were not a major force until the late 1980 s, have
since grown exponentially. By 2016, 266 million Americans were in plans administered
by PBMs. PBMs save cost by, inter alia, negotiating rebates from drug manufacturers and
discounts from pharmacies; implementing plants with tiers of drugs based on the drug
costs to steer participants to lower cost alternatives; implement mail order programs;
and offering a wide variety of the utilization management programs, including prior
authorization, step therapy, and quantity/duration reviews. See PHARM. CARE
MGMT. ASS N, Our Mission, https://www.pcmanet.org/our-industry/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2019). Beginning in 2014, PBMs like Express Scripts and Caremark implement drug
exclusions for a wide variety of drugs as part of their national formulary, offering
alternative drugs that were intended to be clinical equivalents. See Thomas Reinke,
PBMs Just Say No to Some Drugs- But Not to Others, MANAGED CARE MAGAZINE (Apr. 5,
2015),
https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2015/4/pbms-just-say-no-some-drugs-not-o
thers. In the process, PBMS have become behemoths. As of 2018, Express Scripts was the
25th largest company in the United States with $100 billion in sales and $4.5 billion in net
income. Express Scripts is also in the process of being acquired by the insurer CIGNA for
a proposed $54 billion. See FORTUNE 500, The Fortune 500,
http://fortune.com/fortune500/express-scripts-holding/ (last visited May 14, 2019).
300. For example, the Keenan Pharmacy Purchasing Coalition delivers cost savings and
advance prescription management through negotiating strength to leverage volume
discount pricing and the most generous manufacturer drug rebates. See KEENAN,
Pharmacy Serviceshttps://www.keenan.com/Solutions/EmployeeBenefits/PharmacyServices (last visited May 14, 2019).
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since retired is something that to employers, especially if they have
purchased that liability in an acquisition, seems unnecessarily and
unfairly burdensome to the bottom line. After Tackett and Reese, they
have little reason for any further anxiety about the legacy of those
retirees who earned healthcare benefits by relying on what the
employer told them when they were earning them. The legacy of
Tackett and Reese is that even those employers who always
understood the nature of their obligation to retirees now have a clear
roadmap to escape that obligation.
Tackett and Reese were decided in the context of present-day
realities. But, the promises were not made in the most recent CBA
they were made decades ago. In reliance on those promises,
employees worked for decades to earn what they were promised.
No court can determine the meaning of a promise made in collective
bargaining in 1970 without first understanding what the CBA
actually is. No court can determine what the parties intended in 1970
except "by reference to the background which gave rise" to the
promise in 1970.
By failing to cite Warrior & Gulf Navigation and long-established
principles regarding the fundamental nature of labor agreements
and federal labor policy, the Supreme Court relegated decades of the
crucially relevant evidence of how the parties themselves viewed
their contractual obligations - evidence that was "equally a part of
the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it" 301
to the judicial dust heap.
VII. CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Roberts has stressed that his responsibility, and
that of all Supreme Court Justices, is to simply call "balls and
strikes," regardless of their personal predilections. But, the Justices
cannot call "balls and strikes" fairly if they do not k now where home
plate is located. Without stare decisis, the Supreme Court is "making
up the strike zone as [it] goes along." 302
During the forty years I have practiced in federal courts, each
new Supreme Court nominee has promised fealty to the ideal of
impartiality that he or she would impartially decide cases based on
fidelity to precedent rather than personal ideology. Each nominee
has been questioned on his or her view of the validity of "precedent''
301. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
302. Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 683,

685-86 (2016).
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and each has pledged for reasons entirely unrelated to any concern
for the rights of retirees - to honor the Court's existing precedent and
the lessons of experience and history.
In the most recent confirmation, stare decisis took center stage.
Some Senators apparently felt comfortable enough with Judge
Kavanaugh' s characterization of Roe v. Wade303 as "settled" law to
vote for his confirmation as Justice, despite his earlier advice not to
refer to Roe v. Wade as the "settled law of the land" in 2003. 304 And,
in his confirmation proceedings, Mr. Kavanaugh referenced his
statement in a 2016 law review article that United States v. Nixon305
was one of the II greatest moments in American judicial history," 306 to
counter his 1999 statements that "maybe Nixon was wrongly
decided - heresy though it is to say so." 307 As Paul Simon wrote:
"Such are promises, all lies and jests, still a man hears what he wants
to hear and disregards the rest." 308
I expect that many of the retirees I represented in Reese, whose
lives may be shattered by the loss of the benefits they worked so hard
to earn, most of whom still live in Wisconsin and Iowa, voted for a
President whose principal success so far is to appoint only judges
carefully vetted by interest groups who zealously advocated for that
loss.309 I know that there are retirees who blame the UAW, not the
courts, for this injury.
Stare decisis assumes an even more critical role in times like this
when partisan fever and fundamental disagreements about the
303. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
304. See Robert Barnes and Michael Kranish, Kavanaugh Advised Against Calling Roe v.

Wade settled law while a White House Lawyer, WASH. POST (Sep. 6, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/kavanaugh-advised-againstcalling-roe-v-wade-settled-law-while-a-white-house-lawyer/2018/09/06/f30216dc-b1df11e8-a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html?utm_term=.77ceacbd9103.
305. United States v. Nixon, 415 U.S. 683 (1974).
306. Kavanaugh, supra note 296, at 688.
307. See Greg Stohr, Kavanaugh Once Thought the Supreme Court s Nixon Decision Might be
Erroneous , TIME (July 22, 2018), http://time.com/5345351/trump-supreme-court-brettcavanaugh-nixon/
308. PAUL F. SIMON, The Boxer, on BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS: THE ALBUM
(Columbia Records 1969).
309. This is not to say that the four Democratic Justices protected retiree contract rights
or protested the failure of stare decisis. They failed as miserably as the five Republican
judges in Tackett and Reese in identifying governing precedent. The best they could do in
their Tackett concurrence was to note and correct a few of the majority s major omissions
about Litton and ordinary contract law principles. See M&G Polymers USA, LLC v.
Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 936 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In Reese, when adherence to
ordinary contract law became mandatory, they were agonizingly silent. See generally CNH
Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).
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validity of prominent precedent are acute. Ironically, in such times,
when justices are selected for their views on particularly divisive
issues and then claim, for example, that their confirmation hearings
constitute a "high tech lynching" 310 or an "orchestrated political
hit''311 by the opposing party, the Constitutional tenure protection
intended to assure judicial independence may instead be the means
for perpetuating existing bias. In this scenario, the Supreme Court
must even more scrupulously adhere to the principles underlying
stare decisis to assure a modicum of impartiality in the judicial
decision-making process.
What happened in Tackett and Reese would not happen if the
issue were abortion rights or the authority of the special counsel to
subpoena the President. In such cases, no litigant, judge or Justice
could possibly ignore Roe v. Wade or United States v. Nixon. In the
current climate, long-established federal labor law policies and the
income security of tens of thousands of retirees can pass below the
radar of judges and lawyers, as well as most Americans. 312 But, given
the importance of stare decisis as a check against a biased judiciary,
what happened in Tackett and Reese cannot be ignored. We must
closely examine whenever and wherever the law ends, especially if,
as John Locke cautioned, that is where tyranny begins.313

310. Hearing on the Senate Judiciary Committee of the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the

Supreme Court, 102nd Cong. (Oct. 11, 1991).
311. Hearing on the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to the
Supreme Court, 115th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/nomination-of-the-honorable-brett-mkavanaugh-to-be-an-associate-justice-of-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states-day-5.
312. None of the law review articles or case commentary the author reviewed on Tackett
and Reese noted their failure to cite or follow Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g. Spencer
Cook, The Supreme Court of the United States held that courts shall interpret Welfare plans in
employee collective- bargaining agreements using ordinary principles of contract law, 17
TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE J. BUS. L. 197 (2015); Robert A. Hillman, The Supreme Court s
Application of Ordinary Contract Principles to the Issue of the Duration of Retiree Healthcare
Benefits: Perpetuating the Interpretation/Gap-Filling Quagmire, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 299
(2017); Maria O Brien Hylton, After Tackett: Incomplete Contracts for Post-Retirement
Healthcare, 36 PACE L. REV. 317 (2016); Bruce Levine, Labor & Employment Law, 66 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1027, 1069 (2016); Tex Pasley, Ordinary Principles of Contract Interpretation v.
Ordinary Principles of Contract Interpretation: The Future of Retiree Healthcare Benefits After
M&G Polymers v. Tackett, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL Y & L. 125 (2017).
313. John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, Book 2, Chapter XVIII, §202, (Hollis ed.
1689) ( Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another s harm;
and whoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the
force he has under his command to compass that upon the subject which the law allows
not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; . . ).

